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When a country's planning and budgeting  process should be made public in order to
system is dilapidated, an important first step is to  educate public opinion about economic altema-
rehabilitate basic budgetary and accounting  tives, build a consensus, and spread responsibil-
functions and to generate public expenditure  ity for public spending choices.
data that can provide a starting point for rational
planning.  Other basic measurce.  include:  *  Monitoring development projects and pro-
grams requires explicit information on actual ex-
The budget process should first determine  penditures of individual projects and the entire
what resources are available and adopt aggregate  program, including simple breakdowns by im-
revenue and expenditure targets. Then the entire  plementing agency, sector, source of finance,
set of public expenditure issues should be looked  and so on.  For investment programs, it must be
at simultaneously. If total expenditure is al-  possible to relate expenditure infomiation to a
lowed to be the outcome of the aggregation of  financial plan for each project.  The use of
sectoral bids, the overal  expenditure is almost  standardized project profiles for all approved
certain to be unsustainable.  projects is an invaluable technique.
- The responsibility for reconciling expendi-  * The financial woes of developed countries
ture bids with agreed overal  targets must be de-  increase the value of extemal aid and the lever-
centralized.  Sectoral ministries should be given  age exercised by aid agencies.  To minimize
ceilings within which to prepare their estirdtes.  friction with aid agencies, govemments should
exercise careful aid management by monitoring
* It is vital that recurrent and development  project preparation and implementation, working
expenditure programs be considered simultane-  to minimize project problems, and encouraging
ously in each sector, since a country's ability to  dialogue between the govemment and aid
sustain the recurrent costs arising from new  agencies.
investrnent may be doubtful.  In restructuring
recurrent budgets, it is important to establish  This is a background paper for the 1988 World
"norms ' for the level and distribution of expen-  Development Report.  Copies are available free
diture to provide properly for key services.  from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Rhoda
* In the long run, the budgeting and planning  Blade-Charest, room S13-060, extension 33754.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  This paper was  commissioned  by  the  World  Bank  as  a  contribution
towards  the  preparation  of  the  1988  World  Development  Report  (WDR).  I  was
asked to comment on the  points made in  a preliminary  outline  of  the
proposed  Public  Expenditure  chapter of the  WDR and  to  illustrate  my
comments  with  specific  examples  of  problems  and  attempted  solutions.
2.  The  paper draws  mainly on  my  own  practical  experience  and  that  of
Mokoro  Limited  in  the  field  of  national  and  public  expenditure  planning.
As will  be  apparent,  this  experience  is  heavily  concentrated  in  Anglophone
sub-Saharan  Africa (SSA).  Readers  familiar  with  other regions  will  be
able  to  judge  which comments  may  have  a  wider  relevance.  Annex  A lists
some  of  the  published  documents  to  which I  referred in preparing  this
paper,  but  it  is  not  exhaustive,  and  I  also  referred  to  a large  number  -f
unpublished  World  Bank  documents.
3.  The  paper  began  as  a series  of  comments  on  an  early  outline of :'.e
WDR.  It  retains its  early structure  in  that  it  consists  of  a  number  of
separate  but  related  comments  on  aspects of  planning  and  budgeting  in
Africa.  I  have arranged  my  observations  under  three  main  headings.
Section  II deals generally  with the planning  and  budgeting  process,
Section  III concentrates  on  the  problems  associated  with  the  planning  of
recurrent  expenditure,  and  Section  IV  addresses  aid  agency  involvement  in
and  technical  assistance  to  planning  and  budgeting.
4.  One  theme of  this paper  is that  many of  the  necessary  reforms  to
planning  and  budgeting  systems  (PBSs)  are  very  simple  (which  is  not  to  say
that  they are  easily accomplished).  There  is  a tendency  on  the  part  of
governments  and  external  agencies  alike to  look for more  sophisticated
solutions  than are  actually  required.  It  is  not  sophisticated  economic
analytical  techniques  that are  most lacking  but  simple  organisational
ones. However,  the  basic  elements  of  an effective  PBS  are  interdependent;
in  countries  where the PBS  is  in disarray,  isolated  improvements  to
elements  of  the  PBS  may  be ineffectual.
5.  Opinions  expLessed  are,  of  course,  my  own  and  not  necessarily  shared
by  the  World  Bank  or  any  other  body.
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II.  PLANNING  AND  BUDGETING  PROCER9Z.
planning  and  Budgeting  - Ideology  and  Stereotypep.
6.  The  WDR  outline  noted correctly  that tnere  has  been  a  trend  away
from comprehensive  economy-wide  plans towards less  ambitious  forms  of
forecasting/planning  public expenditure.  This trend  has not  been
uncontested,  however,  and there remain  very  different  concepts  of  what
really  constitutes  planning. These  contrasting  attitudes  contribute  to
the  climate in  which planners  and  aid  agencies  have  to  operate  and  are
worth  some  attention for that reason alone.  Moreover,  some of  the
distrust  of  the  trend towards  public expenditure  planning  is  based  on  a
confusion  of  technical  Issues  with  Ideological  ones.  Disentangling  the
two would he,p to  promote  consensus  about the  general  importance  of
planning  and  controlling  public  expenditures.
7.  The  basic  Ideological  divide is a  familiar  one, between  market-
oriented,  non-interventionist  preferences  at  one  end  of  the  spectrum  and
Interventionist,  'planned  economy'  preferences  at  the  other.  The
existence  of  ambivalent  attitudes  within government  Is particularly
noticeable  in  countries  that have adopted a  socialist  rhetoric  and/or
where a  substantial  proportion  of  economists  have had Eastern-bloc
training.  The  association  of the capitalist  World Bank and IMF  with
proposed  reforms is  enough to  attach a pejorative  label  to  them  in  many
minds.
8.  Ideological  predispositions  are reinforced  In many  cases by
institutional  cleavages  between  the Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  Ministry
of  Planning. (As  noted  below,  the  institutional  division  between  Finance
and  Planning  more often that not  survives  attempts  to combine  the
ministries.)  There is, unfortunately,  considerable  validity in  the
stereotypes  which see  finance  ministries  as  concerned  with  short-term
expenditure  control more  than the  long-term  effectiveness  of  government
expenditure  or  the  overall  developmental  and  macro-economic  effects  of  the
government  budget, while Rlanning  ministries  are  too concerned  with
economy-wide  aggregates  over which the  government  has  little  practical
control.  Hence  the  irrelevance  of  many  of  the  planning  documents  produced
by  the latter and  the absence of  strategic  direction in  budgetary
management  by the  former.
Page  2ALLOCATION  AND  MANAGEMENT  OF  PUBLIC  SPENDING
9.  Each minlstry is,  of  course, more sensitive  to  the other's
shortcomings  than to  its own,  and there  is  a  corresponding  tendency  for
planning  ministries  to  see emphasis  on public  expenditure  management  as
the abandonment  of "real"  planning  and the triumph  of  the  "finance"
viewpoint.  This Is unfortunate  because  the case for better  public
expenditure  management  Is  not  an  Ideological  one and Is only
coincidentally  associated  with  a  trend  towards  market-orlented  as  opposed
to interventienist  approaches. Fiscal  prudence  is  not  an  exclusively
capitalist  or  socialist  trait.  Any  government  will  be  more successful  In
pursuing  Its  goals,  whatever  they may be, If it  can  make  realistic
assessments  of  the  resources  available  to  it  and draw  up and  implement  a
coherent  strategy  for  their  allocation.  A  government  which  is  unable  to
plan  Its  own  expenditure  Is  unlikely  to  be  very  effective  in  plann!.ng  for
the  economy  as  a  whole.
10.  The  most  effective  pressure  for  better  public  expenditure  planning
has  stemmed  from  the  financial  predicament  in  which  SSA  governments  find
themselves,  but this  also  helps  to  explain  the  lack  of  enthusiasm  for  the
trend  within  these  govc-rnments.  Ministries  of Planning  could  see  the
trend  as an opportunity  to impose  developmental  views  and  a  strategic
perspective  on  the  budgeting  process.  In  practice,  they  are more  likely
to  view the  situationi  as  one in  which  power  shifts  to  the  Ministry  of
Finance  in  order  to  Impose  a  series  of  cuts  on  a  whole  range  of  government
programmes.  Planning Ministries  are especially  likely  to feel
marginalised  by  this process  if their  previous  emphasis  has been  on
incremental  capital  investment  and  the  promotion  of  developuent  projects,
since  development  expenditures  are  likely  to  be  the  most  severely  cut.
11.  In  the  short  term  the  sidelining  and  alienation  of  the  designated
planners  within government  may  make  little difference  to the
implementation  of  emergency  restructuring  programmes.  In  the long  run,
howevez,  programmes  which  are  the  product  of  duress  rather  thah  conviction
must  be  less likely  to yield sustained  improvements  in planning  and
budgeting  systems.
Minlstry  of  Finance  vs  Ministry  of  Plannlng
12.  A  common  institutional  question  is  whether  the  Ministry  of  Finance
(MF)  should  be  merged  with  the  Ministry  of  Planning  (MP). The stress  on
public  expenditure  management  as  a  fundamental  aspect  of  planning,  if  not
Its  main  component,  makes  this  more  topical.  The  issue  is  not  new: there
are  many examples  of mergers  between  Planning  and  Finance  ministries  and
almost  as  many  examples  of  a  subsequent  demerger.  A  number  of  countries
have  been through  several  rounds  of  this  process.  only  rarely  is  there  a
genuine  fusion  of  MF  and  MP;  more  often  a  single  Minister  simnly  presides
over  both  the  pre-existing  institutions.
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13.  The  question  of  whether to  have  one  ministry  or  two  In  the  field
of finance  and  planning  is,  In Itself,  not very  Important,  although  the
issue  of  reconciling  MF and  MP  roles  is.lll  As  already  noted,  there  is
considerable  validity in the stereotypes  that Planning  and Finance
ministries  perceive in  each  other. So  long  as  those  stereotypes  persist,
it  Is  Inevitable  that  the  two  lnstitu  . will  be  uneasy bedfellows,  and
that  the  Issue  of merger  will be  pd. tived  as the  subordination  of  one
institution  to  the  other.  In a clime  of financial  stringencv,  it  Is
also  almost inevitable  that  the  Ministry  of  Plenning  will  see  mer;er  as  a
means  of  strengthening  Ministry  of  Finance's  hand  in pursuing  expenditure
reductions.121
14.  It is  Important  therefore  to  conduct the  debate  in  terms  of  the
substance  of  the  planning  and  budgeting process rather  than the
institutional  prerogatives  involved. Maybe  improvements  in  that  process
can  be reinforced  by  changes  in  the  institutional  arrangements  between  MF
and  MP,  but  these are  not  the  essence of  the  problem.  For  example,  a
common  and  fundamental  weakness  has  been a  disjunction  between  recurrent
and  development  budgets.  Often  these  are  drawn  up  by  separate  processes,
even  different  sets  of people,  with little  or  no  account taken  of  the
complementarities  between recurrent  and  development  activities  within  a
given  sector. Stich  a  weakness  may  be perpetuated  and  exacerbated  by
institutional  dichotomy  between MF and  MP,  but  "merger"  will not
necessarily  resolve  the  problem,  and  resolution  of  the  problem  need  not
necessarily  involve  merger.
15.  A  number of current and  proposed  projects  for  assistance  to
planning  agencies  in  SSA  have  been  premised  on  an assumption  that  current
problems  in planning  and  economic  management  are  a result  of  the  weakness
or  decline of Ministries  of  Planning.  This  Is  a  misleading
interpretation,  although it  is one  naturally  favoured  by  Ministries  of
Planning.  Their  preferred  inference  is  that  their own  status and  powers
need  to  be  restored. In  practice,  a more  convincing  explanation  is  that
largely  exogenous  economic  crises  have  simply  exposed  Inherent  defects  In
planning  systems and  institutions.  Nostalgia  reveals  an Inability  to
grasp  this  point.
[11  It  is  also  necessary  to  take account  of  the  role of  the  ministry
responsible  for manpower/personnel,  especially  in view of the
importance  of  planning  and  rationalisation  of  recurrent  expenditures.
(2]  It Is  significant  that  the  successful  merger  of  Finance  and  Planning
Ministries  in Botswana (a) involved,  in  effect,  the  takeover  of
Finance  by  Planning  (the  converse  is  more  common)  and  (b)  took  place
in  a context  of  rapid  expenditure  growth.
Page  4ALLOCATION  AND  MANAGEMENT  OF  PUBLIC  SPENDING
16.  Weakenl:g  of  Ministries  of  Planning  has  undoubtedly  occurred,  but
as  an  effect  rasther  than  a cause  of  economic  crisis.  They have  suffered,
as  have othez  government  agencies,  from general  debilitation  associated
with  prolonged  budgetary  crises. In  many  cases  too  their status  has  been
devalued  by  the  sharp diminution  In the  development  budget  resources  in
their  gift,  at  the  same  time  as  their morale  has been  undermined  by the
palpable Irrelevance  of many of the  planning  documents  to  which  they
devote  so  much  of  their  efforts.  See  Box  4  below  for  an example.
DilaRidation  of  Planning/Budget  Systems
17.  Assessment  of  institutional  performance  and  capacity  is  inevitably
somewhat  subjective,  but  it  can  be  based  on  indices  such  as:
- whether,  and  with  what  lags,  government  accounts  appear;
- the  credibility  of  the  expenditure  records  that  are  kept;
- whether  a  recognised  budgeting  routine  and  timetable  is  adhered  to;
- whether  Estimates  appear  on time  (i.e.  at  or  near  the  beginning  of
the  FY  to  which  they  refer);
- whether  EstImates  are  published  and/or  adequately  circulated  within
government;[31
- the  degree  of  credibility  of  the  Estimates  as  a  means  of  controlling
the  volume  and  compositien  of  public  eypenditure;[41
- the  information  available  about  and  the  control  exerted  over  public
service  employment.
[31  It  is not  uncommon  to  find  spending  ministries  or  departments  that
have never  seen the Estimates  that  are supposed to govern
expenditure.  In  some  cases  standards  have  deteriorated  to  the  point
where  this  is  no  longer  considered  abnormal  by  those  affected.
(41  Aid agencies  are very sensitive  to the quality  of financial
administration  by governments.  In  most  cases  they  choose  to  bypass
the  government  institutions  in  which  they  have  no confidence.  This
is  understandable,  but  may  exacerbate  the  problem  of  rehabilitating
government  capacities.  (For  example,  the separate  routing  of  aid
funds  often  makes  It harder  for governments  to  manage  and  monltor
their  development  programmes.)
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18.  Two  related points are  worth making  about  the  Ollapidation  of
planning/budgeting  systems  and  institutions  in  BSA:
(a) It  is  easily  overlooked  Just  how  far  the  deterioration  has  gone  in
some  cases. (See  Box  1  for  a typical  scenario.)  This  has  direct
implications  for  the  nature  of  the  remedies  that  are  practical  and
the  speed  with  which  they  can  be  effected.
(b) At  the  same  time,  although  the  fundamental  economic  problems  faced
by SSA countries  are  strikingly  similar,  there are  important
differences  between countries  in their  institutional  performance
and  potential.  (See  Box  2 for  an illustration.)
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Box  1t  Deterioration  of  Planning  and  Budget  Systems  - a  Typleal  Scenario.
The  following  scenario illustrates  the deterioration  of  planning  and
budgeting  systems  that  Is  common:
- Production  of government  accounts  has  fallen years  behind.  As  a
result  budget  documents,  instead  of  comparing  current  estimates  wilth
previous  actual  expenditures,  show  only  previous  estimates  (and  not
even  previous  years'  actual  releases).
- Aid-funded  expenditures,  which  form  a  high  proportion  of  development
expenditure,  do  not  generally  pass  through the  government  budget.
Although  attempts  are  made to  note  such  flows,  it  is  believed  that
estimat,s  of aid  funding  are  often too high, since there  is
insufficient  allowance  for slippage  and the  planned  phasing  of
earmarked  expenditures  over  a number  of  years,  so that  there Is  a
danger  of double  counting  aid  flows  In  the  aggregation  of  estimates
from  one  yaar  to  another.
- Annual  project  estimates  are  not  linked  to  planned  life-time  project
costs, and  so  there is little  basis  for  tracking  and  monitoring
project  expenditures.
- Control  over  the  public  service  payroll has  virtually lapsed.  The
government  does not  know the  numbers  on  the  payroll  or  how  many  of
those  on  the  payroll  are  "ghosts".  Despite falling  real wages  the
number  of  putilc  sector  employees  continues  to  rise  steadily.
- Financial  control  has also  deteriorated,  and  It  Is widely
acknowledged  that  actual  uses  of  funds  often  differ from  authorlsed
uses.  (Thus,  even data  on  the  pattern  of  releases  of  funds,  when
available,  has  to  be  treated  with  reserve.)
However,  budgetary  control  has  not completely  broken down.  In  some
respects  management  has  been quite  conL-ervative,  with  releases  of  funds
being  more  closely  geared  to  revenue  receipts  than  to  the  Estimates.  This
form  of  expenditure  control  is  quite  arbitrary:  cuts  fall  across  the  board
and  cannot  be  anticipated  by  those affected. Although  the payroll  is  a
priority,  public  sector  borrowing  has  fuelled  inflation  and  both  personnel
and  non-personnel  expenditure  has  fallen  in real  terms.  Growing  numbers
of  public employees  have added to  the  downward  pressure  on  real  wage
levels. Officials  of Planning  and  Finance Ministries  are  themselves
poorly  paid and  supported,  and  there  has  b'< an  exodus  of  accountants  to
the  private  sector.
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Box  2z  Institutional  Contrasts  between  Countries.
To Illustrate  the  range of  institutional  environments  within SSA  it  is
worth  contrasting  Tanzania  with  Ghana. (This  is  not  to imply  that  either
country  represents  an  extreme,  and  It  should  also  be  noted that  G;,dna  has
made considerable progress  towards  rehabilitating  Its planning  and
budgeting  system.)
The  qualitative  directions  for  Improvement  of  the  planning  and  budgeting
system  (PBS)  In  Tanzania  and  Ghana  are  quite  similar  but  the  institutional
contexts  are  very  different. While the PBS  in Ghana, at  its  nadir,
reached  almost  complete  dereliction,  the  comparable  Tanzanian  institutions
have remained  much stronger,  despite also experiencing  the  kind  of
deterioration  described  in Box  1.  In Tanzania  the  PBS  is  thoroughly
lnstitutionalised  - procedures  are well  established  and  their  legitimacy
(as distinct  from theli efficacy)  is not seriously  questioned  by
participants.  There Is a  large cadre of  Tanzanian  planners  and
administrators,  many of  them very  experienced  in  the  positions  that  they
hold. Their  diligence  Is  particularly  noteworthy  against the  background
of  deteriorating  material  support  and  declining  real  salaries  that  applies
across the  public service.  The documents  whose production  Is  the
principal  focus of  activity  appear  regularly,  in  a timely  fashion  and  are
printed  and  circulated.
The  planning  and  budqeting  process  in  Tanzania  Is  genuine  and  effective  In
the  sense that actual resource  allocation  does  depend  on  Its  outcome.
This  is  not  to  say  that actual  allocations  match  those planned:  through
failure  to anticipate  fully  the  dearth  of  resources,  large  and  systematic
discrepancies  between planned  and actual  allocations  have  become  usual,
especially  In real terms.  But the pattern, If not  the  level,  of
allocations  Is  strongly  determined  by  the planning/budgeting  process,  and
this  in  turn  means  that  participants  are  bound  to  take  it  seriously.  This
is  not  a trivial  point,  given that  the formal  planning/budgeting  process
In  some other African countries  Is largely  superficial,  cosmetic  and
Irrelevant.
The  relative  strength  of  the Tanzanian  PBS obviously owes much  to
political  continuity. It  provides  a  very  different  base  from  which  to
address  common  public  expenditure  problems  than  was  available  in  Ghana.
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19.  Where dilapidation  has gone furthest,  it makes the task  of
imprjving  public  expenditure  management  more  difficult,  in  two  ways:
- first,  rehabilitation  of  basic budgetary  and  accounting  functions
becomes  a prerequisite;
- secondly,  there is  an  absence  of  the  current and  historic  public
expenditure  data  that  should  provide  the  starting  point  for  rational
public  expenditure  planning.
The  latter point  relates  not  only to  whether  ba.slc  Information  (such  as
recent  actual  expenditure  data)  Is  available,  but  also to  the  credibility
of information  that  emetges  trnm  a budgetary  system  that  many  participants
have  learned  from  experience  not  to  take  too  seriously  (see  Box  3).
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nox  3: Devaluation  of  the  Budget  Process  - an Example
Deterioration  In budget  processes  easily  becomes  a vicious  circle. The
following  example,  based  on  a real  case,  illustrates  how  budgetary  systems
can  be  eroded  and also  how  the  consequent  disillusion  Itself  becomes  an
obstacle  to  the  system's  rehabilitation.
Original  Situation:  In  the  1970s  standard  budget  guidelines  were  Issued
by  the Ministry  of  Planning  and Finance.  In  the  case  of  Health,  these
were  f6llowed  by  guidelines  from  the Health  Planning  Unit  to  provincial
directors  and  divisional  heads. The  format  of  the  Budget  for  the  Ministry
of  Health  was  standardised,  meaning that all  Budget preparation  forms
could  be  pre-printed  and  each  year  the  Planning  Unit  issued  a new  edition
of  a  complete  set  of  forms for  preparing  the  annual Estimates.  Budget
preparation  began early  and  followed  a  well-formulated  timetable.  There
were  established  procedures  for  consultation  between the  different  levels
of  the  health  system  and  the  national  ministry  provided  all  concerned  with
a  list  of  standard  costs, revised annually,  for use  In the  detailed
computation  of  budgets.  The  list  contained  standard  costs  for  feeding
patients  and  trainees,  for travel  and  miscellaneous  allovances,  vehicle
purchases  and  running costs, and  for  a  variety  of  standard  office  and
health  facilities  equipment.  Those  compiling  the  Estimates  had  details  of
expenditure  so  far  during the  current year. Initial  preparation  of  the
Estimates  took  place  over  a two-month  period,  during which  Planning  Unit
staff  would be  expected  to  visit all  provinces;  this  was  followed  by  a
month  In  which  the Planning  Unit appraised  all  submissions  and  prepared
the  aggregated  Ministry  of  Health  Budget. Submission  of  the  draft  to  the
Ministry  of  Finance  then  took  place  three  months before  the actual  start
of  the  financial  year  In  question.
Present  gituation: Things are  now  very  different.  In  principle  nothing
has  changed,  but  the  discipline  of  the  timetable  has  been lost,  and  the
data  essential  for  preparation  and  evaluation  of  the  budget  are  no longer
available.  In  the  last  budget  cycle,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  circular  did
not reach Ministries  until after the deadline for Estimates to  be
submitted;  it  contained  no  resource  guidelines  but  Introduced  changes  in
the  procedure for  reckoning  certain  items  that  nullified  preparatory  work
that  the  Ministry  of  Health  had taken  on  Its  own  lnitiative.  Moreover,
because statistics were generally lacking  and no  unit costs were
available,  provincial  directors  and  heads of departments  set about  the
budget  preparation  with  no  sense  of  purpose.  Knowing  what  had  happened  in
previous  years  they  failed  to  adhere  to  the timetable  established  by  the
Planning  Unit, which  In the  end  had  to prepare  a  consolidated  Ministry
Budget  In  the  apace  of  a  single  weekend without  much regard  to  the  few
departmental  and  provincial  submissions  that had been received.  No
evaluation  was  possible  and  consequently  the  MoH  was  unable  to  provide  the
type of  Justificatlon  of  Individual  Items  and  sub-items  at  provincial
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level  that  the  MF  sought.  The  budget  that  eventually  emerged  bore  little
resemblance  to  what  had  been  submitted,  and  as  the year proceeded  the
Ministry  of Finance released  only 50S of  budgeted  provision  for  non-
personnel  ltems.  No  guidance  was  given  as to  how  the  cut  in  funds  should
be  allocated  between  Items  and  sub-items  within  the  budget  and  expenditure
on  some  Items,  such  as  the  feeding  of  patients,  exceeded  both  the  releases
and  the  budgeted  provision.
Consegqences: Not  surprisingly,  beleaguered  health  officials  have  become
rather  cynical.  They know  that the  government  cannot  fall to  allocate
resources  to  the  health  services.  They  know  that  whatever  they  submit  as
a budget  request  will not  be reflected  In the  ultimate  approval,  which
will  arrive late  and be  at  variance  with  the  funds  subsequently  released
for  expenditure.  They also know that whatever  they submit, or  even
whether  or  not  they submit  a  draft,  will  not  be  assessed  by  the  Hinistry
of  Health  which,  anyway,  exercises  little  authority  or sanction. A cycle
of  mutually reinforcing  scepticlsm  prevents  the  budgetary  exercise  from
being  taken  seriously  by  any  of  the  participants,  and  this in  Itself  can
stymie  attempts  to  rehabilitate  the  system.
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The  Importance  of  Budget  Process  and  Presentation
20.  Managing  public  finances  In SSA  has  become  typically  an  exercise
in  crisis  control.  In  a  crisis  atmosphere,  horizons  shorten  and  there  is
a  tendency  also  to  narrow  the  group  of  effective  decision  takers.  In  the
long  run,  however,  better  public  expenditure  management  requires  a  more
public  process.  Indeed,  the process  of planning  may  be  at  least  as
valuable  as  the  budget/planning  documents  that  are  Its visible  product.
The  opportunities  for  educating  opinion  about  economic  alternatives,  for
building  consensus,  and for  spreading  responsibilities  for public
expen#lture  choices  more widely  are lost If the process  Is  always
conducted  in  secrecy  and  in  haste.
21.  The  task  of rehabilitating  budgetary  systems  may be long  and
difficult,  especially  where current dilapidation  is particularly
extensive.  Tt  may  be  some  time,  for example,  before  government  accounts
can  be restored  to the  point  of  providing  a  reliable  benchmark  for  each
year's  budget  exercise.  At  the  same  time  some  Improvements  are  available
that are relatively  simple  and straightforward  to  Implement.  The  way
information  is  presented  to  (ostensible)  decision  makers  Is often  a  case
in  point.
22.  Thus,  for  example,  budgets  (and  Annual  Plans  - see  Box  4)  that  are
presented  to  parliaments  and  published  are often  remarkably  uninformative
documents.  A  simple  shortcoming  (though  it  may on  occasion  be  less  an
oversight  than  a  reflection  of the state  of monitoring  and  accounting
records)  Is the failure  to show  previous  years'  actuals  and/or  future
yeaLs'  projections  alongside  the current  year's  estimates. This  is
particularly  common where  projects In the development  budget  are
concerned.  Estimates  commonly  give  a  so-called  "one-year  time-slice"  of  a
proJect  without  indicating  its  fund!'.g  requirements  in  subsequent  years  or
revealing  its previous  expenditures  (or  if these  are shown,  the  period
covered  may be  unspecified  or  Inconsistent  among  projects).  Very  often
projects  exist  for  yeaxs  without  more  description  in the  budget  documents
than  a  short  title. rn such  circumstances,  parliamentary  discussion  of
the  budget  is  almost  bound  to be  perfunctory  and  superficial.  The  less
information  Is provided  In the  budget  documents,  the  less  effective  they
are  as  a  means  of  controlling  and  directing  actual  expenditure.
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Box  J:  Annual  Plans
The  concept of  an  Annual  Plan that  translates  a  medium-term  plan  Into  a
practical  annual  programme  is  superficially  attractive,  but  does not  seem
to  work well  in practice.  Typically,  the  preparation  of the  Annntal  Plan
suffers  from  the  absence  of  a  realistic  medium-term  financial  framework.
In  principle,  the  Five  Year  Plan (together  with  a longer  term  Perspective
Plan  if  there  Is  one)  provides  the  broad  "resource  envelope"  to  which  the
annual  exercise  hqs  to  conform.  Most  often,  the  economy  is  so  far  off  its
anticipated  cour ,  that  these  documents  are  no  longer  relevant.
The  Annual  Plan  Is  usually  prepared  as  part of  the  same  exercise  as  the
annual budget and  there Is therefore  no  question  of  an  annual  budget
narrowly  concerned  with government  expenditure  being set within  the
context  of  a  prior,  more  general,  Annual  Plan. The  detailed  tables  of  the
Annual  Plan  add  little  to  those  provided  in  the  budget documents,  and  nor
does  the Annual  Plan provide  projections  that  extend  beyond  the  budget's
horizon.  A lot  of  administrative  effort  goes  Into  the  preparation  of  the
Annual  Plan but  to  very  little  practical  purpose.  To  a large  extent  the
document  becomes an end  in  itself.  (It is  what the  Planning  Ministry
does,  while  the  Budget  Is  what  the  Finance  Ministry  does.)
A more  relevant  approach  requires:
(a) that  medium term  Plans be  more  closely  geared  to  the  planning  of
public expenditure  (recurrent  as  well as  capital) within a
realistic  resource  envelope;
(b) that  the annual  budget Itself  be  seen  as the  principal  mechanism
through  which  the  Plan  Is  effected  and,  If necessary,  adjusted  to
new  circumstances;
(c) that  the  planning  horizon for  both  Plan  and  budget  should  always
extend  two  to three  years  beyond  the  current  fiscal  year.
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23.  It  Is worth  paying  attention  too to  the  way  in  which  budgetary
aggregates  are  summarised,  since  this  can affect  the terms  of debate  on
budgetary  policy.  A key  concern  should  be  the  size  of  the  budget  deficit
(defined  as  the  gap between  expenditure  and  domestic revenue)  and  there
should be  special attention  to how  the deficit  will  be  financed  (by
external  aid  and  by  foreign  and  domestic  borrowing).  This  essential
information  is  often obscured  by  arbitrary  classifications  of  revenue
(e.g.  by  treating  domestic  borrowing  as  revenue on a  par with  tax
receipts)  and, most  seriously,  by  a failure  to  present  reasonable  forward
projections  of the  budget. It  Is not  just a  question  of  failing  to
present  this information  publicly:  all  too  often  the  planners  themselves
do  not  compile  It  or  see  the  need  for  it.l51
Budget  Hethodology  - tile  Importance  of  Seguence
24.  In  principle,  the  determination  of  the  budget  Involves  the  solution
of  a  set  of  simultaneous  equations  that reconcile  revenues  with
expenditures  and  so  forth. In practice,  the  process of  formulating  a
budget  Is as  much political  as  it  is technical  or  economic,  and  it is
bound  to  be iterative.  Whether the  outcome of  the  process  represents  a
sustainable  budget path and whether the  allocation  of  resources  is
optimal, subject  to the  general constraints on  overall resource
availability  and  other specific  constraints  that may  apply,  may  well
depend  on the  sequence  the  process  follows.
25.  A key  aspect  of the  approach  advocated  in  the  present paper  Is
that  it  Involves  looking  at  the entire  set  of  public  expenditure  issues
simultaneously.  A  system that  allowo major  expenditure  decisions  to  be
taken  separately  and  at different  times Is  bound to  generate  an  upward
pressure  on  expenditures  and  Is  very unlikely  to  achieve  a satisfactory
overall  pattern  of  expenditure.C61  If  total  expenditure  is  not  explicitly
targeted,  but  allowed  to  be  the  outcome  of  a  process of  aggregation  of
sectoral  bids, the  aggregate  expenditure  target  that  emerges  Is  virtually
151  A similar  sloppiness  Is  often  shown  in  studies  of  public  expenditure
when  the allocation  of resources  among  sectors  is  analysed  without
making  a  distinction  between discretionary  and  non-discretionary
elements of expenditure.  The biggest  non-dlscretionary  Item  Is
usually debt-service,  and analyses  of  expenditure  that do not
separate  out  public  debt  can  be  particularly  misleading.  A  sector's
share  of  discretionary  expenditure  may  have held  up  even  when  its
share  of  total  expenditure  has  fallen  sharply.
[61  But  viewing  the  entire  set of  public expenditure  options
simultaneously  means  that  there  has  to be  direct competition  among
projects/programmes  that may  be  at  different  stages  of  definitlon
and  appraisal.  This creates methodological  problems  that  are
discussed  later  in  this  paper.
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certain to  be  unsustainable.  The reconciliation  of  expenditure  with
resources  actually  available  then takes place  piecemeal  and  often
arbitrarily,  through more or  less selective  cuts  in expenditure,  or
withheld  provision,  or  non-compensation  for  Inflation,  or erosion  of
public-sector  salaries.  Responsibility  for  post  hoc  reconciliation  of
actual  expenditure  with  resources  available  usually  falls  to  the  Ministry
of  Finance,  which  then  attracts  the  odium  that  goes  with  It,  together  with
justified  criticism  for  the  inefficiency  of  such  methods of  expenditure
control.
26.  It Is  crucial,  therefore,  that  the  budgetary  exercise  should  bgisn
with  the  assessment  of  overall  resource  availability  and  the  adoption  of
aggregate  revenue and  expenditure  targets.  The  initial  assessment  and
proposal  of  targets  should  Involve  collaboration  between  the  main  economic
agencies  of  government  (noably  the  Ministries  of  Planning  and  Finance  and
the  central  bank). The  p.,posed  targets should then be  explained  and
accepted  at  tne  political  level  before the  detailed  elaboration  of  the
budget  proceed  .
27.  The next requirement  Is that responsibility  for  reconciling
expenditure  bids with  the agreed  overall targets  must  be  decentrallsed.
It is  neither  effective  nor  efficient  for  this  role  to  be  left  entirely  to
the central MF/MP.  The  overall target  needs  to  be  disaggregated  and
sectoral  ministries  given cellings  within which  to  prepare their
estimates.  This forces sectoral  agencies  to  reveal  priorities  and  Is
often  resisted  for  that  reason: ministry  headquarters  would  rather  simply
aggregate  bids and  force fF/MP  to  do  any  cutting,  even  though  the  sector
ministry  is  usually  in a  better position  to  judge  which cuts  are  least
undesirable.
28.  The  process  of  disaggregation  of  the  overall  targets  among  sectors
tends  to  make  theoretical  economists  uncomfortable.  In  theory,  one  should
chose  between all  alternative  uses  of  expenditure  at the  margin,  and  the
methodological  basis  for  segmenting  the allocative  mechanism is  shaky.
Nevertheless,  the  sectoral  disaggregation  of  targets  is  not  In  practice  as
difficult  as It  might seem  In prospect,  particularly  since  the  exercise
never starts from a  blank slate, but begins with  the  inertia  of  an
existing  pattern of expenditure.t71  The  best  way  to  test the
appropriateness  of sectoral  ceilings is  to draft  a budget  that  complies
with  them. It is  then  possible  to judge  whether  there  are  Imbalances  that
should  be  corrected  by transferring  resources  from  one  sector  to  another.
[71  See  also the  sections  of  this  paper  dealing  with  project  selection
and  the  search  for  recurrent  expenditure  "norms".
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Economic  Analysis  of  Prolects  and  the  Preparation  of  PIPs
29.  Even leaving  aside the  relationship  between an  investment
programme  and  recurrent  spending,  which  is considered  In a later  section
of  this paper,  the preparation  of  a  Public  Investment  Programme  (PIP)  Is
considerably  less straightforward  than the  preparation  and  appralsal  of
the  individual  projects  of  which  it is  comprised.  Among  both  aid  agencies
and  governments  there  Is a  tendency  to assume that the task of  PIP
preparation  consists  simply of  the simultaneous  analysis  of  a lot  of
projects,  using  familiar  proJect  analysis  techniques.
30.  A little  reflection  shows  that  Lhis cannot  be  the  case, for  the
following  reasons:
- The  PIP  his to take Into  account  the  stock  of ongoing  projects.
Typically,  these  are  numerous  and  varied,  and  documentation  of  them,
especially  o'-  ones  that are  not aid-funded,  Is  patcly.  Many  are
more  properly  recurrent  than Investment  activities;  others  are,  in
principle,  Investment  projects,  but are  kept alive  at  a level  of
funding  that  does  not move  them appreciably  nearer to  completion.
To  take existing  projects  as  given  and  consider  only  the  merits  of
potential  new  projects  Is  not  an  option  because:
(a) most often,  available  resources  are  Inadequate  for the
completion  of  all  ongoing  projects;
(b) the  necessary  information  as  to  what  is  involved  in  the
completion  of  ongoing  projects  Is  not  readily  available,  but
has  to  be  sought  as part  of  the  exercise;  and
Xc) the  continuation  of  many  existing  projects  Is  not  defensible
even  in  spite  of  the  sunk  costs  argument.
- There  is  the  widely  recognised,  but  recalcitrant  problem of  finding
appropriate  techniques for comparing  dissimilar  projects  that
compete  for  funds  (education  vs  infrastructure,  for  example).  (See
Box  5.)
- There  Is the less appreciated,  but  equally awkward  problem  of
asynchronism  between  projects. The  project cycle is a familiar
concept.  Projects  pass  through  various  stages  between
identification  and  completion.  All but  very small and  simple
projects  are  likely  to  pass through successive  stages of
progressively more  rigorous  planning  and  appraisal  before
Implementation.  A full-scale  cost-benefit  analysis,  or  equivalent
analytical  technique,  is  only  applicable  when the  project has  been
worked  out  in  detail. Preparing  a  PIP  requires  considering  all  the
projects  that  represent  potential  claims on  resources  during  the
planning  period, but  they will  not  all  be  at the  same  stage  of the
Individual  project  cycle.
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Box  5:  "Obiective"  Ranking  Criteria  for  Prolect  Selection
There  Is a recurring  tendency  for economists/planners  to  try  to  escape
from  the  element  of  subJ%ctivity  In deciding  between  competing  claims  on
expenditure.  Devising  ranking  systems  whereby  projects  are  awarded  points
according  to  their  perceived  contribution  to various objectives  Is  one
ploy.  But  it rather  gives  the  game  away  when  the  devisers  of  the  system
have  to  reject  the  results  as "wrong".  One  example was reported  in
roughly  the  following  terms:
In  this activity  the  project  has  made  a  substantial  and  unambiguous
contrilbution.  In  collaboration  with  senior (Ministry  of  Planning]
staff  a set  of  18  criteria  were  established.  The  development  of  the
computer  network  allowed  all (PIP)  projects  to  be  ranked  in  order  of
priority  in  order  to  prepare  a core  programme.
At  the  same time, It was  noted  that  mechanistic  application  of
criteria  produced  some  maverick  results.  The  criteria  were  heavily
weighted  in favour  of directly  productive  activities  and  the  first
round of  ranking virtually  eliminated  projects  in the  social
services  sectors.  It was  therefore  necessary  to  depart  from  a
strict  ranking based on  economic  criteria  by  ore-selectlng  the
sectoral  composition  of  the  investment  programme.  (Emphasis  added.)
In  view  of  the  time  constraint,  this  was  no  doubt Inevitable,  but
the  project  team  should  review  the  bases  of  the  criteria  in  order  to
allow  for linkages  between the outputs of the  social  services
projects  and  economic  productivity.
Why  look  for  a  key  to  the  back  door  when  the  front  door  is  open?
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31.  For  those who  start  from  a paradigm  in  which  rigorous  analysis  of
*n  individual  project  leads to  a  yes/no  decision on  its  implementation,
according  to  whether It meets some objective  criterion,  such as  a
specified  ERR,  the  puzzle of  how  to  compile a  defensible  PIP  Is  Indeed
perplexing.  It  need  not  be. The  practical  approach  Is:
(a) to  segment  the  problem  by  dividing  the  available  resource  parameters
among  sectors,  so  as  to  confine direct  trade-offs  between  projects
Initially  to ones  that  are  broadly  similar;
(b) to  see  the  process as  a  matter  of  screening,  In  which  the  Initial
acceptance  of  projects  Is  conditional  on  their  meeting  satisfactory
appraisal  criteria  at the  appropriate  stage  In  their  life-cycle;
(c) to  recognise  that  the proposed  phasing  of  projects  Is  as Important
an issue  as outright  acceptance  or  rejection.
32.  Within  this  framework,  the importance  of  maintaining  a  rolling
multi-year  perspective  becomes  clear. Given  lead  times  and  implementation
periods  for  projects,  freedom of  manoeuvre is  much more  limited in  the
short  term  than  over  several  years.
33.  The  preparation  of  standardised  project  profiles  (see  Box  6)  Is  a
simple  but  Invaluable  technique  in  preparing  and  managing  a PIP.
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Box 6;  Prolect  Profiles
The  documentation  that  projects  ultimately  require varies  a  great  deal,
depending  on  the nature, size and  complexity  of  the project,  the
requirements  of  the  funding  agency  and  so forth.  But  decisions  need  to  be
taken  at  many  stages before  full documentation  and  implementation  of  a
project.  These  include  preliminary  judgments  whether  the  project  merits
the  effort  of fuller  write-up  and appraisal,  what Its  costs and  phasing
are  likely to  be,  and  which  potential  source  of  funds  may  be  appropriate.
The  discipline  of  preparing  simple standardised  project profiles  at  an
early  stage Is  invaluable.  (See  Botswana's  National  Development  Plan  and
Planning  Officers'  Manual.)
Both  the  words  and  numbers  of  a  profile are  Important.  It  Is  Idle  to
manipulate  figures that  cannot  be  related  to  a basic  project  description,
while  It  is  also  vital  at  an  early  stage  to  estimate  the likely  costs  and
potential  benefits  of  a proposed  project,  even  though  these  estimates  will
require  subsequent  refinement.
The  essential  components  of  a project  profile  are:
(a) a  concise description  of  project  content,  objectives  and
anticipated  effect;
(b) an  unambiguous  Identifying  title  and  project  number;
(c)  an  estimate  of  project  costs  from  commencement  to  completion;
(d) a  proposed  annual  phasing  of  costs;
(e) an  estimate  of  the  recurrent  costs  arising  from  the  project.
The  profiles need  to  be  on  the  record  and  compiled  according  to  the  same
currency  and  price conventions.  In  updating Investment  programmes
annually,  the summary figures for all  profiles  need  to  be  revised,  to
reflect  both  general  changes  (in  price levels,  for example)  and  specific
changes In  the cost of phasing of  Individual  projects.  ProJect
descriptions  should  need  less  frequernt  amendment  but  provide an important
check on whether the orlginal  prolT.nt  concept Is being  adhered  to.
Crucially,  project  profiles  and  development  budget  categories  must  be  made
consistent  with each other, so  that the profiles  provide  the  bridge
between  the  medium  term  plan/investment  programme  and  the  annual  budget.
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Monltoring  and  Managing  Plans  and  Investment  Programmes
34.  Monitoring  of  development  projects  Is  rightly  a  matter  of  concern.
Thls  is  appropriate  both  to  keep  track  of  projects'  implementation  and  to
discover  whether  they  have  the  effects  intended.  But  the  factors  that  are
most  Important  In  the  monitoring  of  a  plan/investment  programme  as  a  whole
are  not  necessarily  the  same  as for  the  individual  projects  of  which  it  is
comprised.  Different  types of  information  may  be  required  and  by
different  sets of  people, and  for the  programme  as  a  whole  there  Is  a
premium  on  standardised  project  information  that  can  be  aggregated.  Very
often  elementary  Information  that might  be regarded  almost  as trivial  by
someone  responsible  for  the  M&E  of  a  particular  project  would actually  be
extremely  useful if consistently  available  for  all  projects.  When  it
comes  to the  aggregate  monitoring  of  a  PIP, there  is a  clear order  of
priority  for  the  Information  that  Is  needed,  and  sophisticated  but  partial
information  is  much  less  useful  than  basic  but  comprehensive  data.
35.  The  first  requirement  Is  Information  that  should  be, but  often  is
not, available from government  accounting  records concerning  actual
expenditures  by Individual  projects  and  the  programme  as  a  whole.  Simple
breakdowns  by  implementing  agency, sector, source  of  finance  etc.  are
crucial,  as is  their  prompt  availability.  Of  course  financial  information
of  this  sort  may  conceal  as  much  as It  reveals.  Physical  progress  may  not
be  commensurate  with  expenditure,  a project  whose  financial  implementation
Is  going  according  to  plan  may  nevertheless  be  totally  misconceived  and
so forth. Financial  monitoring  Is  not  enough,  but  It  Is  a  vital  starting
point  and  first  priority.
36.  As far  as Investment  programmes  are  concerned,  a second  elementary
requirement  is  that  it  must  be  possible  to relate  expenditure  information
to  a  financial  plan  for  each  project.  The  development  and  maintenance  of
standardised  project  profiles  for  all  approved  projects  is an Invaluable
technique  (see  Box  6). Initially,  at least,  monitoring  data  should  follow
the classifications  used  In  project  administration,  even  If  these do  not
correspond  precisely  to  economic  or  other  relevant  categories.
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37.  Basic  monitoring  Is  thus  strongly  related  to  the  rehabilitation  of
government  accounting  systems,  but  this may  be a  long process  and
substitutes  may have  to  be  sought  in  the  Interim.  In  setting  up  a system
to  monitor  the  investment  programme  Independently,  the  emphasis  should  be
on  making basic  Information  rapidly  available.  It  Is  Important  to  pay
attention  to  the  relevant  lncentive5.  Firstly, Information  should  be
collected  by  those  who  are  intended  to  use  It,  since  the  "customer"  for
Information  has  the  greatest  Interest  In  It  and  should  be  best  able  to
Identify  priorities  In  Its collection  and  analysis.  Secondly,  there  need
to  be  appropriate  Incentives  for  the providers  of  the  Information. (A
simple  incentive  Is  to  make  releases  of  funds conditional  on  the  prior
provision  of information  about  previous  expenditures.) conversely,  where
the  supplier  of information  does  not have  a very  direct  Interest  in  the
exercise,  his  task can at  least be  made less onerous by  accepting
Information  In  the  form  that  comes  most  easily  to  him.
38.  Often  the  pressure  for  better  monitoring  comes  from  aid  agencies.
This  can  be  useful. For  example,  the external  Incentive  provided  by  the
desire  to  present  progress  reports  to  a  CG  may  help  to  counterbalance  a
government's  natural  preoccupation  with  short  term  crisis  management. On
the  other  hand,  it  Is  Important  that  the  government  should  be  persuaded  of
the  value  of  the  monitoring  exercises  proposed  and able eventually  to
sustain  them  without  external  assistance.181
39.  Most Investment  programmes  are  poorly  managed. This  Is  Indicated,
Inter  alia,  by the  perpetuation  of  projects  that  fall  to  progress  and  by
the  difficulties  commonly  experienced  In  rapidly  utilising  available  aid.
Improvements  depend  both  on  better  current  monitoring  of  the  programme  and
on  better  forward  programming.
[8]  "  ...  monitoring  and  evaluation  has  been  largely  donor-led,  whether
at  project or  national  level.  The  Information  generated  and  the
time-frames  for  its  production  have  almost always  been  defined  by
donors. There  has  consequently  been  little  useful  feedback  Into  the
national budgeting  and planning  processes.  This  predominance  of
donor  Interest  In monitoring  and evaluation  Is echoed In  the
frequent  --  almost  universal  --  complaint  that  government  monitoring
and  evaluation  has been Ineffectual  on account of a  lack  of
political  commitment  by  governments.  Without  that  commitment  and  a
domestic  demand  for  monitor.ng  and  evaluation,  It  seems likely  that
past  failures  and  inadequacies  will  only  be re-created."
" ...  government  monltorlng  and  evaluation  systems  established  in
some  SSA  countries  have  been  overly  complex,  bearing  the  hallmark  of
external design and  lnattention  to  local personnel  and  other
constraints.  one common result has  been that monitoring  and
evaluation  systems set  up  on  donor instigation  and  principally  by
means  of  technical  assistance  have  rarely  survived  the  withdrawal  of
such  assistance." (Both  quotations  are  from  Commander,  1987.)
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40.  A large  part  of  the  difficulty  of  managing  an investment  programme
well  arises  from  uncertainty  about  (and fluctuations  In) the level  of
resources  available,  and  from  the  fact  that  arbitrary  expenditure  control
is  usually  easier  to  impose  than  selective  restriction.  The concept  of  a
*core"  programme  Is  an  attempt  to address  both  these  difficulties.  The
aim  is  to  ensure  that  the  most  important  projects  are  not  Interrupted  by
delays in releasing  funds on account  of  general  financial  stringency.
Since  funds  available  can never  be  forecast  with certainty,  It will  be
possible  to  protect the core only If  (a) the  total  PIP  Is  not  too
optimistic  in  its  resource  assumptions  and  (b)  the  core  does not  form  too
large  a proportion  of  the  PIP.
41.  Furthermore,  core projects can be protected  only  If  there  are
adequate  budgetary  mechanisms  for  Identifying  them  and  for  releasing  funds
in  a  discriminating  way.  Funds for  core  projects  should  be  released
automatically  at  the  beginning  of each accounting  period, whereas  funds
for non-core  projects  should only be  released  selectively  and  after  a
further  review  of  the  financial  position.
42.  However,  non-core  projects  that  require  "lumpy"  expenditure  (e.g.
a single  construction  contract)  should  also  not  be interrupted  once  begun,
and  may  therefore  have  to  be  treated  in  the  same  fashion  as  core  projects
once  they have  been allowed  to  commence.  The  corollary  Is  that  non-core
projects  should  not  be  allowed to  start unless sufficient  funding  to
complete  them Is  assured.  In  turn,  since  implementation  of  most  projects
extends  over  a number  of  years,  this  emphasises  the  Importance  of  basing
budget and  PIP  on  a  rolling,  multi-year  perspective  of  resource
availability.  Put  another  way,  designation  of  core programmes  may  be  a
useful  expedient,  but  it  should  become  much  less  necessary  as expenditure
planning  Is  strengthened.
43.  An important  aspect  of  PIP  management  Is  to  ensure  that funds  are
used  for their  designated  purposes.  Control  systems  can  help,  but  cannot
solve the  problem In  the  absence  of  political and  bureaucratic
commitment.[91
[91  One  development  expenditure  control  unit  found  that  Its  own  funding
was  the  first  to  be  diverted  - by  the  Ministry  of  Planning  itself!
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III. RECURRENT  BUDGET  ISSUES
Budget  Classification
44.  Criticism  of  the traditional  distinction  between  recurrent  and
development  (or  capltal)  budgets  Is  commonly  overdone.  The  divlsion  often
works  poorly  In  practice,  but  there  Is  more  to  be  gained  by  Improving  than
by  abolishing  It.  The distinction  between recurrent and  capital
expenditure  corresponds,  albeit  roughly,  to  the  distinction  In  economics
between  cornumption  and  Investment.  It  encourages  attention  to  the
problem of  financing  the  recurrent  costs arising from development
expenditures.  The  biggest  drawback  of  the  recurrent/development
demarcation  In  practice  Is that  It  can  allow  the  two  budgets  to  be  drawn
up  separately,  by  different  processes  and even by  different  groups  of
pecple.  Particularly  now  that  the  ability  of  governments  to  sustain  the
recurrent  costs  arising  from  new  Investment  Is  so  often  doubtful,  It  Is
vital  that  recurrent  and  development  expenditure  programmes  are  considered
jointly  within  each  sector. But equally,  within each  sector as  well  as
overall, it Is  important  to analyse proposed  programmes  into  their
recurrent  and  capital  components.
45.  In  many cases, existing  demarcations  between  recurrent  and
development  budgets  cannot  be taken  at  face  value:
(a) So-called  projects  funded under the  development  budget  are  often
locally-funded  recurrent  activities.
(b) The  same  applies,  but  In  a  less  straightforward  way,  to many  aid-
funded  projects  and  project  components;  aid  agencies  have  recognised
that  It  Is  pointless  to  finance new  Investments  In  sectors  where
recurrent activities are  grossly underfunded,  but  they are
constrained  to  dress  up  their  aid  as  development  support.  There  Is
a  spectrum ranging from rehabilitation  projects  which  are,  In  a
sense,  genuine  investments,  but  ones which would not have  been
necessary  but  for  the neglect  of  O&M,  to  the  funding  of  equipment
and  materials  that  constitutes  more  or  less  direct recurrent  budget
support.[101
(c) It  is also rightly polnted out that some  recurrent  activities
(health  and  education  provision  for example)  can  represent  very
important  forms  of  Investment.
[101 Also,  of  course,  much  aid  may  fall  to  be  reflected  In  the  government
budget  at  all.
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46.  The  recurrent/development  categorisation  Is  not  the  only  one  that
Is  potentially  very  helpful for  the analysis  and preparation  of  public
expenditure  programmes. Often,  the  structure  of the  budget,  particularly
the  recurrent  budget,  does not easily yield elementary  breakdowns  of
expenditure  which  relate to  crucial policy issues  that arise In
expenditure  programming,  such  as  the breakdown  between  expenditures  on
primary  and  secondary health care, between  different  educational
institutions,  or  between  different  districts or  regions.  (A
classification  that easily  yields one  type of  breakdown  - e.g.  between
salaries  and  other charges - may be  correspondincly  opaque In  other
respects.)
"RSecurrent  costs  arlsing"
47.  The  Importance  of  anticipating  the  recurrent  costs  (and  specific
O&M requirements)  arising from new development  projects Is  now a
commonplace.  However,  largely because of  past  neglect  of  this  point,
there  is  hardly  anywhere  where  monitoring  the  recurrent  costs  associated
with  new  projects  Is more  than a  small  contribution  towards  the  task  of
assessing  the  true  level  of future  claims  on  the  recurrent  budget. The
issue  has macro  dimensions  that  cannot  be  adequately  addressed  by  a  micro
(project)  approach.
48.  In  the  first  place, public  finances  are  often In  such  dlsarray
that  It  Is  futile  to  look  to  precedents  to  establish  the  likely  recurrent
funding  requirements  of  a  new project.  Reliable  historic  figures  on
actual recurrent  costs associated  with previous  projects  are  rarely
available,  and,  in  a context of  chronic underfunding  of the  recurrent
budget,  actual experience  Is likely  to  understate  true  costs.  Secondly,
preparing  an  accurate  estimate  of a  proJect's  recurrent  funding
requirements  Is Itself  no  guarantee  that  they  will  actually  be  met  (though
it  may  be  a valuable  aid  to  project  selection).
49.  The macro questions  that cannot be  reached through proJect
analysis  alone  Include:
(a) The  development  Implications  of  the  develogment  budaet:  development
pro,ects,  particularly  locally-financed  ones,  are often  grossly
underfunded  and  their cost to complete (which  may  well  not  be
justifiable)  is  commonly  a matter  of  conjecture.
(b) The  develonment  implicatlons  of  the  recurrent  budget:  a  substantial
backlog of maintenance  has  often  built  up  so  that  rehabilitation
projects  may  make  a substantial  prior claim on development  funds
available.  Also, built-in  growth of services (e.g. primary
education)  may  have  implications  for  development  expenditures  (e.g.
school  construction).
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(c) The recurrent implications  of the  recurrent  budget:  this  has  two
components  - the  expenditure  claims  Implicit  In  current  underfunding
of  recurrent  services,  and predictable  growth  In  those  commitments
that may  not carry corresponding  project  costs to  which the
recurrent  arising  could be  attributed.  This aspect may be
particularly  recalcitrant,  as discussed in the paragraphs  that
follow.
Recurrent  expenditure  wnorms" and an  approach  to  the  restructuring  of
recurrent  budgets(lll
50.  Questions  about  the  appropriate  level and  pattern of  recurrent
expenditures  are  Increasingly  being raised  In  parallel  with  World  Bank
PER/PIP  exercises.  In  one  exercise  related  to  the  framing  of  a Structural
Adjustment  Credit, the  government  was asked  to "establish  expenditure
norms  for  the  main  [non-personnell  Items  of  expenditure  for  the  Ministries
of  Agriculture,  Health and  Education"  and  to  establish  procedures  for
Implementing  the norms.  Some  of  the  lessons from  the exercise  are  of
general  relevance.
51.  Thete  was considerable  confusion  as  to  what  this  exercise  was  to
comprise,  although  the  background  situation  was clear enough.  During
years  of  financial  stringency  (a)  the  real  value  of  resources  available  to
the  Health,  Education  and  Agriculture  sectors  of  Government,  among  others,
had  fallen  and (b) the  proportion  of  those  resources  devoted  to  Personal
Emoluments  (PEs)  had  increased.[121  One of  the aims of  the  recovery
programme  had therefore  to  be  to reverse  both  these  trends  - i.e.  to
Increase  the  levels  of  resources  allocated  to  these  key  sectors  and  at  the
same  time  to  correct  imbalances  in  resource  allocation  within  each  sector.
[111 The  system advocated in this section  reflects  that  successfully
developed  In  Botswana  over  many  years.
1121 It  is not always the case that declining  real resources  are
accompanied  by an increase  in  the  share  of  resources  devoted  to  PEs.
The  sight  of  personnel  with  virtually  no  material  support  suggests
this  conclusion,  but  It must  be  remembered  that there  have  often
also  been  drastic  declines In  real salary levels.  The  primary
problem is the  poverty of  governments;  the maldistrlbution  of
residual  resources  is  a secondary  effect.
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52.  Such  Imbalances  are  often quite  tangible:  teachers  without  text
books,  extension  workers  without transport,  hospitals without  drugs,  and
so  on.  But,  although  the  problem  is  highly  visible,  years  of  stringency,
ad  hoc  budgeting  and  arbitrary  expenditure  control, combined  with  poor
expenditure  records,  make it difficult  to  know what the level  and
distribution  of expenditure  now  ought  to  be in order  to  provide  properly
for  key services.  Hence,  a search  for  "norms"  to  guide  the  allocation  of
resources  as recovery  commences.  There  are  potentially  "norms"  at  several
different  levels, all  of  which  may  be  relevant  to  aspects  of  the  problem.
53.  Thus,  for  example,  nozms  may  be  sought  at  the  level of  effllency
wilthin  operatlons. If you  have  a  car,  you  also  need  the  fuel  etc.  to  be
able  to  run It,  and  a norm  here  might  simply  be  a  rule  of  thumb  based  on
experience  as  to  how much  ought to  be  provided  for  the  running  cost  of
each  vehicle. Such  an  approach  can  be  very  valuable,  both  In  framing  and
In  evaluating  budget  estimates,  but  it  also  has  Its  limits.  While  It  may
be  straightforward  to  establish  a  general rule about the  true  running
costs  of  a vehicle,  this  still leaves  open  the  question  of  who  actually
needs  vehicles  and  how  many  of  what  sort. Similarly,  rules  of thumb  are
often  used to  relate provision  for the  maintenance  of  a building  to  Its
original  construction  cost,  but  such  rules  do  not  address  the question  of
whether  existing  buildings  are  adequate  or  appropriate  for  their  purposes.
54.  A second level  at  which norms  may  be  sought  concerns  the  balance
between  programmes  or  activities  within  a sector.  For  example  guidelines
could  be  adopted  about  the  balance  between  primary  and  secondary  services
In  both  the  health  and education  sectors,  or about, say, the  balance
between  agricultural  extension  and  agricultural  research.
55.  There  is a third,  more  aggregative,  level  at which  one  could  ask,
for  example,  what  would  be  the  level  of  resources  reguired to  run  entire
sector proarammes  2roDerly (how much would it  cost  to  fully  fund  the
existing  health  service?)  Or,  going further,  attempts could  be made  to
relate flnancing levels for services  to external criteria,  such  as
relating  services  required  to  the  size  of  the  target  population  (universal
primary  education,  Health  for  All,  etc).
56.  Finance Ministries,  and  especially  their  staff  responsible  for
administering  the  recurrent  budget,  dre  likely to Interpret  norms  rather
narrowly.  Standardised  unit costs  are often  a familiar  concept,  though
they  may  have  fallen out  of  use  in conditions  of  rampant  Inflation  and
budgetary  chaos.  Beyond that,  the search  for norms  may  be interpreted
mechanistically  in  terms of  rather arbitrary  ratios between  different
subtotals  of  the  budget.
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57.  Two  Important  points  emerged  very  early  on  In  the  exercise:
(a) Proper recording  and  control of  expenditure  Is  a sine  qua  non:
without  Improvements  In  this  direction  norms  of  any  kind  will  not  be
meaningful  or  enforceable.
(b) Thore  Is  considerable scope  for  the  Introduction (or
re-introduction)  of  standardised  unit  costs  (unit cost  norms) as  a
way  of  Instilling  discipline  and ensuring  consistency  In the
compilation  of  the  Estimates.
58.  Concerning  unit  cost  norms the  following  points  should  be  noted:
(a) Few  are  available  "off  the shelf".  Determining  appropriate  unit
cost  norms is  not  always  simple  (local  prices  change  rapidly  as  the
currency  depreciates  and  historic  data,  even If  available,  may  not
be  a  reliable  guide to  true costs),  but  in  time  a useful  body  of
such  norms  could  be  built  up.
(b) To  be  of most use, such norms need to be  available  at  the
commencement  of each  year's budget  cycle so that  they  can  be  used
when  the  estimates  are  first  drafted.  Their availability  later,  as
the  Estimates  are  reviewed  and  finalised,  is  also  useful  but  not  an
adequate  substitute.
(c) Norms  of  this  kind  should  not be  applied too  rigidly,  or  they  may
create  problems  of  the type  they are  intended  to  help  to  remove.
For  example,  similar  vehicles  may  quite legitimately  have  different
operating  costs when used for  different  purposes  or  in  different
regions.  There  needs  to  be  an  element of  flexibility  to  allow  for
this.  Such  flexibility  could  enter  both  in  the  Initial  preparatlon
of  the  Estimates  and  In  the  scope  for  subsequent  virement.
59.  Finally,  useful  as  unit cost norms might be,  it would be  a
delusion to  think that the  entire recurrent  budget could ever be
satisfactorily  built  up from  a  series of  unit cost  norms.1131  Broader
approaches  (within  which  unit  cost  norms  have  a role)  are  likely  to  be of
more  value  In  helping  to  restore a  satisfactory  pattern  and an  adequate
level  of recurrent  expenditure. The  paragraphs  which follow  set  out  a
proposed  budget  methodology.
[131 The  search  for  mechanistic  ways  of  drawing  up  a budget  has  parallels
with  the yearning  for "objective"  project selection  criteria  (see
Box  5).
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60.  How  budget guldelines  could  work.  It  has  to be  accepted  that  the
central  planning/finance  ministry  does not  always know  best,  especially
when  it  comes  to  the  details of  the  effective  management  of  specialised
services.  For  example,  it does not make sense for MF/MP to try  to
stipulate  an  exact allocation  of hospital  expenditures  as between
different  items:  such  a  decision  should  be  left  primarily  to  the  judgement
of  professionals  in  the Ministry  of Health,  and  within  the  Ministry  of
Health  as  well  decisions  about  the  allocation  of  resources  may  need  to  be
decentralised  to  varying  degrees.  The  problem is  to allow  enough
decentralisation  in  the  interests  of efficiency  while retaining  enough
control to ensure that expendlture  patterns  correspond  to  national
priorities  (and  that  the  overall  level  of  expenditure  matches  appropriate
macroeconomic  targets).
61.  A practical  way  of doinq  this Is  to  Issue.  at  the  beginning  of
each  budget  cycle,  expenditure  guidelines  on  what  total resources  will  be
available  and  how these resources  should  be  distributed  between  broad
categories  of  activity.  For  example,  the  Ministry  of  Education  might  be
told  to  budget  for an increase  in  real  terms  of  10%,  but  to  hold  higher
education spending  constant  while  increasing primary  education
expenditures  by  20%  Within these  guidelines,  and  probably  subject  to
restrictions  on recruitment  and  PEs,  It  would  be  left  to  the  Ministry  to
determine  the  best  allocation  of  resources  within  each  activity,  although
their  proposals  would  be subject  to review  by MF/MP  in the  normal  way.
Guidelines  could also be  Issued  on  the  allocation  of expenditures  as
between  regions,  etc.  It would be  necessary  to  restrict  Ministries'
freedom  to  vire  funds from  one activity/region  to  another,  but  virement
within  activities/regions  need  not  be  so  tightly  controlled.
62.  It  must  be  emphasised  that,  in order  for such  guidelines  to  be
used as  a  way  of planning  expenditures,  the  framework  of  Government
budgeting  must  permit  the  analysis  of expenditures  by  programme. For
example,  in Health  one would  want to  be able  to  categorise  votes  into,
say,  rural/urban,  primary/secondary  and  by  region, etc.  Ensuring  that
this  can  be done  Is  more  important  as  a first  step  than  the  derivation  of
the  guidelines  themselves.
63.  The  application  of guidelines  of  this sort would have to  be
Iterative:  I.e. there would have to  be  some  scope  for  adjusting  the
guidelines  in  the  light of  Estimates  submissions  If submitting  agencies
were  able to present  a  compelling  case  for  doing  so. At the  same  time  It
is important  that  agencies  do  not avoid  hard choices  between  alternative
uses  of funds  simply  by  always  appealing  to  MF/MP  for  more  and  shifting  to
MF/MP  the  responsibility  for any  cuts or  omissions  that  may  be  needed.
If,  therefore,  a  ministry Is  convinced  that  one  of its  activities  needs
more  funds  than  Its  guideline  allows,  the  ministry  should  be  required  to
propose  an  equivalent  saving  from  one  of its  other  activities.
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64.  Also,  such  guidelines  would  have  to  aim  at  a gradual  change  In  the
composition  cf  expenditure  - the  "Ideal"  pattern  could  not  be achieved  in
one  step but  would have  to  be  sought  over  a period  of  years. Guidelines
could  only work at all  In a  context where funds actually  released
correspond  closely to the  provision  In  the  Estimates,  and  It  would  be
essential  to  have  timely expenditure  records from  which compliance  with
the  guidelines  could  be  monitored. In  many  cases,  the  decentrallsation
that  Is  Implied  may  be hampered  by  the  fragmentation  of  sectoral
responsibilities  among a  number of ministrles.  The approach  also
underlines  the  Importance  of  the  development  of  economic  planning  skills
within  sectoral  ministries. (Again  the development  of effective
minlsterial  planning  units may  be hampered  by  the  Institutional
fragmentation  of  sectors.)
65.  Derivlng  Expenditure  Guldelines. There  remains the  question  of
how  to  set  such  guidelines.  The  problem  is  probably  not  as  difficult  In
practice as  It may  seem in principle.  It  would  be  very  difficult  to
determine  a  single "correct"  level of  resources  to allocate  to  any
activity, but all  that is practically  required is a  sense of  the
qualitative  directions  for  change.  Thus,  If  It is  apparent  that,  say,
primary  health  care  has  been  underfunded,  expenditure  guidelines  should  be
set  that allow a  faster  rate of growth for primary  health  care
expenditures  than for others; this should  be  continued  (probably  over
several  years)  until  the  Imbalance  ceases to  be  obvious,  but, since  the
process  takes  time,  it  Is  not  necessary  to  know  at the  outset  exactly  what
Its  outcome  will  be  - guidelines  can  be  continually  revised In  the  light
of  experience.l141
66.  All  the  same, It would be  Interesting  to  know, at  least
approxlmdtely,  what  would  be  the  cost of  operating  Government's  existing
services  properly.  Indeed,  thils  Is  a crucial  piece  of Information  If
Government  is  to  plan  Its  public expenditures  rationally  over  the  medium
term,  and  it  has  a  direct bearing  on  the  balance  that  should  be  struck
between  development  and  recurrent  expenditures.  There  Is little  point  In
allocating  incremental  resources  to  new  capital  investment  by  Government
if  the  real  need  Is  for additional  recurrent  expenditure  to  enable  past
Investments to  be properly  utilised. Thus  the  appropriate  size  of  the
Public  Investment  Programme  (PIP) cannot  be  determined  independently  of
decisions  about the  volume of  recurrent  expenditure  required. This  is
true for  individual  sectors as  well as  for the public  expenditure
programme  as  a whole.
[141 Of  courses,  to  allow for rational  adjustment  by  sectors the
guidelines  must  have  a  medium-term  horizon,  although  next  year's
ceiling  may  be  definite  while  subsequent  years'  guidelines  are  more
Indicative.
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67.  This point would apply even If  there  were  no  backlog  of  unmet
recurrent  expenditure  requirements,  since new development  expenditures
generate  additional  recurrent  expenditure  commitments  that  need  to  be
allowed  for  within  recurrent  expenditure  guidelines.  At  project  level  it
Is  vital to  anticipate  the  recurrent Implications  of  each  project. The
PIP  proJect  profile  format  (see  Box  6)  should  take  this  Into  account.  As  a
minimum, for each project  an  estimate  should  be  made  of  the  eventual
annual  recurrent  cost  to  Government  arising  from  its completion. As the
planning  system strengthens  It should  be  possible  to  become  more  precise
and  to  track  the  year-by-year  impact of each project on  the  recurrent
budget.
68.  - Several pragmatic  ways to  estimate  total  recurrent  expenditure
requirements,  either  for  particular  programmes/sectors  or  for  Government
as  a whole,  might  be  considered:
(a) An extrapolation  of requirements  starting  from  a "normal"  period
within  the  country.
(b) Cross-country  comparisons.
(c) Comparison  of  Estimates  requests  with  actual  provision.
(d) Building  up  of an estimate from unit cost norms, as  already
discussed  above.
69.  These  approaches  are  not  mutually  exclusive  and  each  might  have
more  relevance  to  some  sectors  than  to  others.  With  (a)  the  dlfficulty  Is
likely  to be finding  an  appropriate  reference  point,  since  It  Is  so long
since  services  were  adequately  funded  and  there  have  been  such changes  In
price  levels and  In  Institutional  arrangements.  With  (c)  there  may  be  a
problem  that  compilers  of  Estimates  requests  have  become  cynical  about  the
exercise,  knowing  from  experience  that  even  funds  provided  in  the  approved
Estimates  are  by no  means  assured  (see  Box  3).  Availability  of data  may
be  a  problem  In attemptIng  to  employ  cross-country  comparisons.  Also,
some  actlvities  (primary  education,  say) may  be  lnstitut  onally  very
similar  In different  countries,  enabling  compalIsons  to  be  easily  drawn,
but  for  others  (agricultural  extenslon,  perhaps)  it  may  be  harder to  find
good  International  analogies.
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IV.  AID AGlHCTI9J151  AID  COORDINATTON  AND  TECKHTCAL  ASSISTANCE
Effects  of  the  Increasing  Relative  Iportance  of  Aid
70.  The  financial  stringency  that affects most SSA governments
naturally  Increases  the  relative  importance  of  aid  resources.  This  has  a
number  of  effects,  Including:
(a) It  Increases  the  leverage  that  aid  agencies  can  exert. Not  only  do
governments  need the money worse, they are  also less able  to
mitigate  leverage  through  fungibility. Ability  to  accept  aid  that
has  conditions  attached (whether these relate  to policy or
procurement)  without  altering  the recipient  country's  overall
expenditure  profile  depends on  the recipient  having Its own
resources  that  It  can  direct  to  the  activities  that  aid  agencies  are
uaiwilling  to  support.  Nowadays  many countries  find It very
difficult  even to meet minimal local 'unding  requirements  that
"unlock"  external  funds,  and  the  scope  for  simultaneously  satisfying
aid  agency  preferences without  substantially altering  the
recipient's  resource  allocation  pattern  Is  much  reduced.
(b) As  the  relative Importance  of aid  Increases,  so  responsibility
within  government  for  handling  aid  matters  becomes  a  more  valuable
prize. This  factor  underlies  the  contentiousness  of  the  allocation
of  institutional  responsibilities  for aid coordination  in  many
countries  (see  below).
(c) Increasing  dependence  on aid, combined  with  deterioration  In
standards  of  government  administration  and  accounting,  means  that  a
large  proportion  of development  expenditure  bypasses  the  regular
government budget  and  accounts  procedures.  This Is an
understandable  reaclion  by  the ald  agencies,  but  It  increases  the
difficulty  of  establishing  what is  actually happening  in  terms  of
public  expenditures.  Similarly,  the monitoring  of  aid-financed
expenditures  and  proJects  tends  to  follow  the  disparate  requirements
of  various aid  agencies, and may  make more  difficult  the
government's  task of  monitoring  the  overall  expendlture  programmes.
(The  tendency  for  the boundaries  between recurrent  and  development
support  to  become  blurred  has  already  been  mentioned.)
[151 Regardlng  terminology,  a  more restrictive  use  of the  term  "donor"
would  be helpful.  The  term  Is  often  used  loosely  to  embrace  all  aid
agencies  irrespective  of  the  terms  on  which  they  provide  aid. Even
grant  aid  should  not  be  treated as  a  free resource (it may  for
example have. substantial  recurrent  cost Implications  for the
recipient)  and  It  Is  undiplomatic  for  the  World  Bank  to  style  Itself
a  donor  when  much  of Its  aid  Is  on  comparatively  hard  terms.
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71.  Understandably,  the effectiveness  with  which  aid  is  irobillsed  and
used  has  become  a  matter  of  concern  both  to  aid  agencies  and to  recipient
governments.  "Aid coordination"  Is a  recurring  topic  In  the  dialogue
between  aid  agencies  and  governments.  Unfortunately,  as  I  explain In  the
next  section,  the  dialogue  is  often  unproductive  because  of  a failure  to
appreciate  the diversity  of  tasks  that the  term "aid  coordination"  may
cover.
Aid  Management  and  AId  Coordination
72.  Typically  the  dialogue  about  aid  coordination  takes  place  In  terms
of  where  the  institutional  responsibility  for aid  coordination  should  be
located,  and  the arguments  are  often sterile because of  failure  to
appreciate  the  subtleties  of  the  issues  involved. The  management  of  aid
has  many aspects;  once these  are  clearly  distinguished,  it  becomes  clear
that there are  legitimate  and complementary  roles for the various
government  bodies that  are  usually  involved  in  arguments  about  the  proper
allocation  of  aid-related  responsibilities. It  Is also important  to
recognise  and  strengthen  the connections  between aid management  and
development  planning  In  general.  Aid  coordination  is not a  discrete
activity  that can  be compartmentalised  and  assigned  to a single  agency
acting  In  Isolation.
73.  It  needs  also  to  be  emphaslsed  that  aid  managemint  s  a  wider  set
of  activities  that  cannot be  handled exclusively  by  whichever  agency  Is
given  prime responsibility  for aid coordination.  There need to  be
appropriate  links  between  the  Planning  Ministry  and  other  agencies  and,  of
equal importance,  between the aid  coordination  department  and  other
departments  of  the  Planning  Ministry. The  basic  aims  of  aid  management
should  be:
(a) To  optimise  external  resource Inflows,  bearing in  mind  the
capacity  of  Government  and  of  the  economy  to  service  any  debt
involved.
(b) To  optimise  the allocation  of  these resource  inflows,  In
support  of  Government's  general  development  strategy.
(c) To  ensure  the  effective  utillsation  of aid  once It  is
allocated.
These  basic  aims  are  interconnected,  since the  volume of  inflows is  not
independent  of  the  uses  to  which  they  are  put. Funds  may  be  available  for
one  purpose  but  not  for  another,  the  rate at which funds  are  disbursed
will  depend on  the rate  of  implementation  of  the  projects  to  which  they
are  assigned,  and  so  forth.
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74.  There  is an "aid  cycle"  analogous  to,  and  closely  connected  with,
the  "project  cycle".  Its  main  elements  are:
- obtaining  aid  commitments  In  principle
- converting  such  commitments  Into  substantive  agreements
- determining  the  specific  projects/programmes  to  which  the  aid  Is
to  be  applied
- commencing  the  projects/programmes  so  that  disbursement  can  begin
- carrying  through  and  monitoring  the  Implementation  of  projects  so
that  disbursement  Is  fully  and  rapidly  achieved
- recording  and  meeting  repayment  obligations.
75.  Effective  aid  management  requires  attention  to  all  the  elements  of
the aid cycle.  Much of the dissatisfaction  that arises  about  aid
management  concerns  failures  to  move  smoothly  from  one  stage  of the  cycle
to  another  - unconsummated  commitments  and slow  disbursements  being  two
typical  complaints.  Yet  too  often  the  debate  about  aid coordination  has
been  conducted  with  Implicit  reference  to  responsibilities  for  only  one  or
two  elements  of  the cycle,  notably  the  general  seeking  of aid  and  Its
allocation  amongst  alternative  projects.
76.  Aid  agencies  often  bemoan  the  lack of  an effective  central  aid
coordinating  body  on  the  government  side.  This  seems  to relate  mainly  to
two  aspects:
- At the  Xrolect  level  there .'s  need  for  effective  follow-up  of
problems  that arise In the preparation  and Implementation  of
Individual  projects (and  consequently  in the flow  of aid
disbursements).  The  Ministry  of Planning,  as custodian  of  the
development  programme  and  coordinator  of  the  Plan's  preparation,
is  often  the  appropriate  body  to  assume  this  role.  (Note  that  this
function  requires  coordination  within  government  as  much  as  with
aid  agencies.)
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- At  aggregate  level  the  nature  of  aid  has  been  changing.  It  is  now
less  related to specific  conditions  attached Independently  to
"their"  projects  by  the various  aid agencies  and  much  more  to  a
general  appraisal  of  the country's  macroeconomic  management  and
development  strategy  as  a whole. In  this  the  aid  agencies  tend  to
follow  World Bank and  IMF leads, and  the Consultative  Group
process  epitomises  this;  It  creates  a  need  for  forums  in  which  the
aid  agencies  can  discuss  matters  of  common  concern  with  Government
In  the  Intervals  between  Co  meetings,  and  this  In  turn  requires
that  the  Government  be  able  to  take  the  initiative  in  organising
the  necessary  dialogue.  (Again,  such dialogue  requires  many
participants  on  the  Government  side,  but  there  must be  a clearly
identified  agency within Government  with  the  responsibility  for
organising  Government's  participation  In  the  dialogue.)
77.  Governments  are  often  ambivalent  about  "aid  coordination"  meetings
with  aid  agencies,  since  there  is  less  than  universal  enthusiasm  for  the
diminution  of sovereignty  that is  Implied in the  engagement  of  aid
agencies  In "policy  dialogue".  It  could  be  helpful  to  distinguish  more
clearly between meetings that are essentially technical  and  those
concerned  with policy  (although  the  boundaries  inevitably  blur). In  some
cases  government  disinclination  to  create  or maintain  forums for  "policy
dialogue"  has  led to a  failure  to  address  technical  and  bureaucratic
obstacles  to  aid  utilisation  that  government  and  aid  agencies  alike  have
an  unambiguous  interest  In  tackling.
78.  Standards  of  aid  management  are  generally  very  low. Many  (most?)
SSA  governments  are  too passive  In this  respect, leaving  the  initiative
mainly with the aid agencies.  Preparation  of  a realistic  PIP  Is  an
Important  step towards better aid management  since it restricts  the
freedom  of  manoeuvre  of  separate  aid  agencies  in  identifying  and  preparing
projects  that  suit  their  preferences  and  brings  into  focus  the  question  of
which  aid  sources  should be  approached  for  which  projects.[161  It  needs
to  be  emphasised  that,  while  attempts  at  coordination  amongst  themselves
by  aid agencies  may  be  helpful,  they  cannot  substitute  for  effective  aid
management  by the  government  Itself.
1161 This  is  an  aspect of aid management  that is often very  poorly
handled. For  example,  each  recipient  has  a fixed  allocation  of  Lome
Convention  funds  from  the  EEC. The  strategy  should  be to  draw  down
those  funds  as  rapidly  as possible,  not,  as often  happens,  to  assign
them  to  very  long-term  or Inherently  slow-moving  projects.
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YahnIeCA  AsRistance
79.  Public  expenditure  management  and  reform  Is  a  very  sensitive  area
In  which  to  involve  technical  assistance.  (Such  sensitivity  Is  reflected
In  some governments'  preference  for  UNDP  or  bilateral  assistance  In  this
area  rather  than involve  the World Bank.)  General  experience  with
technical  assistance  to  strengthen  planning  performance  and  Institutions
has  been  disappointing.  Short-term  assistance  has been  effective  In
generating  emergency  documents,  such as PIPs,  but  parlaying  this  into
durable  lmprovements  In  planning  performance  is  more  difficult.
80.  As  regards  sensitivities:
(a) It  is  imoortant  to define  the allegiance  of TA personnel  and
consultants  clearly. In most  cases,  irrespective  of  the  funding
source  for the assistance,  personnel  should  be  unambiguously
responsible  to the  government  they  are  assisting.  Personnel  are
bound  to  be  less  effective  If  they  are  regarded  by the  goiernment
as  agents  of  an  external  agency.
(b) A  similar point  applies to the Bank's  conduct  of Public
Expenditure  Reviews.  It  Is  probably  unworldly  to regard  these  as
joint  government/Bank  exercises,  but  they  can  be  of  great  value  In
demonstrating  the kind of analyses  that ought ideally  to  be
undertaken  by  governments  themselves.
81.  Past  failure  of  technical  assistance  has  been  largely  due  to  the
unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  systems  and  institutions  being  assisted.  It
Is  important  to  focus  first  on  the  desired  outcomes  of  the  PBS  and  allow
technical  assistance  requirements  to  be  inferred  from  this.  Too often  it
is  assumed  that  the presence  of.  expatriate  personnel  per  se  can  achieve
Improvements.
82.  Tensions  may be caused  by misperceptions  of why technical
assistance  mav  be  needed.  Governments  are  more  likely  to  accept  TA  If  the
task  involved  is  seen  as  a  highly  technical  one  (say  the  computation  of
ERRs,  for example).  Often,  the  real  value  of  TA  may  be  in  helping  to  re-
establish relatively  straightforward  planning and  organisational
techniques  of  the  kind  discussed  in  this  paper.
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